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BABIES BEHIND BARS: SHOULD INCARCERATED MOTHERS
BE ALLOWED TO KEEP THEIR NEWBORNS WITH THEM IN
PRISON?
I. INTRODUCTION
Society's traditional approach to women offenders has been focused on
"women as prisoners and not.., prisoners as women."1 Harsh implica-
tions for female offenders who are mothers can result from the view that
incarceration not only curtails the prisoner's freedom of movement but
also terminates many of the individual's civil rights as well.2 In reality,
these women are doubly penalized with a prison sentence as well as tem-
porary or permanent loss of their parental rights.3 Modern courts are be-
ginning to recognize that "[a] prisoner retains all of the rights of an ordi-
nary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken
from him by law."' This comment focuses on what impact this trend will
have on one facet of a female offender's parental rights: her right to keep
a child she bears while incarcerated.' An analysis will be made of the
1. Note, Female Offenders: A Challenge to the Courts and the Legislature, 51 NOTRE
DA E L. REV. 827, 829 (1975).
2. This attitude is typified by the Virginia Supreme Court's statement in Ruffin v. Com-
monwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871): "The bill of rights is a declaration of general
principles to govern a society of freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead.
Such men have some rights it is true, such as the law in its benignity accords to them, but
not the rights of freemen."
3. The effect that a parent's incarceration has on her parental rights varies depending on
the jurisdiction. Three of the most commonly used methods in dealing with the rights of
incarcerated parents are:
1. an adjudication that the child is neglected;
2. a special hearing which may be instituted under a variety of circumstances, such as
neglectful or abusive behavior by the parent; open and notorious fornication; mental
illness; intoxication or habitual use of drugs; failure to provide support; or divorce
due to a parent's incarceration;
3. an adoption proceeding by permitting the court to waive the necessity of consent to
the adoption by the natural parent. These statutes authorize such waiver when: the
child has been abandoned; the consent is being withheld contrary to the best interest
of the child; or the parent has been declared unfit.
Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child
Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887 (1975).
4. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
5. It is beyond the scope of this comment to address the incarcerated mother's parental
rights as they pertain to maintaining her relationship with children she had prior to her
incarceration. Some of the most obvious problems incarcerated women encounter in trying
to keep their relationships with their children current include the rural locations of most
institutions for women, the limited visiting hours, and the conditions under which visiting
must take place. See Sametz, Children of Incarcerated Women, 25 Soc. WORKER 298, 299
(1980). For some of the proposed solutions, see On Prisoners and Parenting: Preserving the
Tie That Binds, 87 YALE L.J. 1408, 1425-27 (1978) [hereinafter cited as On Prisoners and
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current situation nationwide with particular emphasis on Virginia's treat-
ment of this phenomenon.
I. Wainwright v. Moore
The Florida case of Wainwright v. Moore6 brought to the forefront of
the nation's consciousness the issue of an incarcerated mother's right to
keep with her the children she bears while in prison. The case dealt with
the plight of Terry Jean Moore, a twenty-two year old, first-offender who
was sentenced to fifteen years (seven and a half years to serve) for an
unarmed robbery which netted five dollars. In 1979 Moore became preg-
nant by a prison guard while serving her sentence at Broward Correc-
tional Institution, Florida's only maximum security institution for wo-
men.' Moore wanted to keep her child with her, but had no hope of doing
so until she accidentally discovered, while working in the prison library, a
Florida statute that stated in pertinent part:
If any woman received by or committed to said institution shall give birth
to a child while an inmate of said institution, such child may be retained in
said institution until it reaches the age of 18 months, at which time the
Department of Offender Rehabilitation may arrange for its care elsewhere;
and provided further, that at its discretion, in exceptional cases, the divi-
sion may retain such child for a longer period of time.8
Moore contacted the Broward County Legal Aid Society which agreed to
Parenting]. Programs directed toward maintaining the parent-child relationship during in-
carceration include: (1) a weekend program at the Maryland Correctional Institution for
Women that includes organized games, films, and leisure visitation; (2) MOLD, a Nebraska
program that allows children under sixteen to spend a week per month with their mothers;
and (3) a program of cooperation between the incarcerated mother and her children's foster
mother in Washington State. See also The Prison Mother and Her Child, 1 CAP. U.L. Rnv.
127, 140-42 (1972) (mother release).
6. 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
7. Memorandum from Florida Clearinghouse on Criminal Justice to All Interested Per-
sons (Feb. 4, 1981) [hereinafter cited as February Memorandum].
8. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24(2) (West 1977) (amended 1979). This statute derives from a
1957 enactment by the Florida legislature. The statute was not the basis of litigation until
1979 because prior to that time women were permitted to keep their babies if they so de-
sired. This practice was stopped when the prison nursery was eliminated by the Department
of Corrections in 1975. The Florida legislature amended the statute in 1979 to read:
(2) If any women received by or committed to said institution shall give birth to a
child while an inmate .of said institution, such child and its welfare shall be within the
jurisdicton of the appropriate circuit court if the mother chooses to keep the infant.
Upon petition by the Department of Corrections, the mother, or another interested
party, a temporary custody hearing before the circuit court judge without a jury shall
be held as soon as possible to determine the best interests of the child. The depart-
ment shall provide and maintain facilities or parts of facilities, within existing facili-
ties, suitable to ensure the safety and welfare of such mothers and children, to be
used at the discretion of the court.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24(2) (West 1979) (repealed 1981).
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represent her. When negotiations with the Department of Corrections to
obtain voluntary compliance with the statute were unsuccessful, the Legal
Aid Society filed suit on Terry Moore's behalf seeking an order enjoining
the Florida Correctional officials from separating Moore's child from her
once it was born. On February 28, 1979, the trial court issued a temporary
injunction prohibiting the state from depriving Terry Moore of the right
to the care, custody, and control of her child for the first eighteen months
of its life.9 Her baby, Precious Agnes Moore, was born approximately one
month later on March 23, 1979.10 The battle was not over, for the state
appealed the circuit court's decision to the Florida District Court of Ap-
peals. The appeals court heard the case in August, 1979 and reversed on
the grounds that the statute did not specifically grant to the mother the
sole authority for making the decision to retain the child at the institu-
tion and that the primary consideration should be the best interests of
the child.11 The case was remanded back to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with the findings of the appeals court.12 Terry
Jean Moore was paroled later the same month and left prison with her
baby before the trial court could rehear the case.13 Since the court's rul-
ing, there have been suits by other incarcerated pregnant women in Flor-
ida seeking to keep their babies. Ten successful suits1' were brought
before the Florida legislature repealed the statute on which such cases
were based.15
Wainwright v. Moore's probed the complexities of the mother-child re-
9. Moore v. Wainwright, No. 79-3425 (Cir. Ct), rev'd, 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
10. February Memorandum, supra note 7, at 3. Terry Moore and her baby were trans-
ferred in April, 1979 to a medium security institution at Lowell, Florida.
11. The Florida appellate court held that:
[The statute] does not give to the mother of a child born in prison an absolute right
to determine where the child will be for the first eighteen months of its life. We
further hold that the statute does not vest exclusive authority regarding placement of
the child with the Department of Corrections. The statute is actually silent as to who,
the mother or the Department, has the right to make this decision. Since the statute
is silent on the subject, the rights of all interested parties; the child, the mother, the
prison officials, in an appropriate case the father, and the State of Florida, must be
considered all in light of the welfare of the child which remains the guiding principle.
Wainwright v. Moore, 374 So. 2d at 588.
12. Id.
13. February Memorandum, supra note 7, at 3.
14. There were ten mothers and eleven babies at the Florida Correctional Institution as of
June, 1981. Memorandum from Florida Clearinghouse on Criminal Justice to Christine Ar-
guello (June 25, 1981) [hereinafter cited as June Memorandum).
15. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24(2) (West 1979) was repealed by the 1981 sessibn of the Flor-
ida legislature. Observers do not expect the state to try to remove all the babies at once.
Their strategy will probably be to move first against those women and babies who are in the
nursery under temporary restraining orders. The state has already filed a petition to remove
custody from one such woman. June Memorandum, supra note 14, at 5.
16. 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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lationship and examined the issue of family integrity as a fundamental
right in deciding whether an incarcerated mother should be allowed to
keep with her a child she bears while in prison." The issues Wainwright
raised deserve special examination because of their applicability in subse-
quent cases which are likely to arise in states with similar statutes such as
Virginia.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF MOTHER-CHILD BONDING
The mother-child bond results from biological dependence and paren-
tal response and is the starting point for the chain of development lead-
ing toward the child's functioning as a healthy adult. "The bond or at-
tachment begins during pregnancy. The days immediately subsequent to
birth are especially influential in the initiation of the maternal bond, trig-
gering a sequence of maturing responses that may have long lasting ef-
fects on the mother-child relationship.""8 In arguing that Moore should
not be deprived of the right to care for her child, the Legal Aid Society
contended that the legislature had voted to preserve the mother-child re-
lationship in recognition of the importance of the bonding process.19
"From a developmental perspective, neither the mother's nor the
child's best interests are served by separating a newborn from his or her
mother.120 Research has shown that "[t]he role of the mother is crucial
for the mother herself. . . her separation from her children and the con-
comitant major change in her role . ..strikes at her essential personal
identity and her self image as a woman."21 In addition to being important
to the mother, the mother-child bond may be critical to the child. A child
needs continuity of care. Although this care may be provided by someone
other than the natural mother, if the incarcerated mother is to resume
care of the child, it should be provided by her. Lack of adequate mother-
ing endangers an infant's mental health or the child's very survival since
the child is deprived of the sensory stimulation and noulshment through
17. February Memorandum, supra note 7, at 4-10.
18. D. YOUNG, BONDING, How PARENTS BECOME ATTACHED TO THEIR BABY 5 (1978). See
generally Hartman, Kris & Loewenstein, Comments on the Formation of Psychic Structure,
2 PSYCHOANALYSIS 90 (1949).
19. The Legal Aid Society noted:
This original mother-infant bond is the wellspring for all the infant's subsequent at-
tachments and is the formative relationship in the course of which the child develops
a sense of himself. Throughout his lifetime the strength and character of this attach-
ment will influence the quality of all future bonds to other individuals.
Brief for Appellee at 11, Wainwright v. Moore, 374 So.2d 586 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(quoting KLAUS & KENNELL, MATERNAL INFANT BONDING, THE IMPACT OF EARLY SEPARATION
OR Loss ON FAMuLY DEVELOPMENT (1976)).
20. Sametz, supra note 5, at 300 (quoting Ainsworth, The Development of Infant Mother
Attachment in 3 REV. CHILD DEV. RESEARCH (1973)).
21. Note, supra note 1, at 840-41 (quoting M. BUCKLEY, BREAKING INTO PRISON 97 (1974)).
[Vol. 16:677
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which it develops a sense of self.22 Separating the child from its parent or
primary caregiver is harmful at any age, but its most serious effects are
seen between the ages of birth to two years. 23 It is during this critical
period that the bond must be maintained between mother and child; for
if it is not, the bond may be impossible to reconstruct.2 " The fact that the
breach in the bond may be irreparable is an ill omen for a mother who,
upon her release, is going to be responsible for resuming the care of her
child.25
Reunion with a parent... represents another major change in a child's life
and may produce anxiety and insecurity.. . . A parent who interprets this
anxiety reaction as a reluctance of the child to [establish a] relationship
may reject the child and thus further complicate the child's readjustment."
The best way to ensure that the bond is maintained is to allow mother
and child to remain together for the critical period of birth to two years. 7
Those in opposition to incarcerated mothers being allowed to keep
their newborns with them point out that most prisons do not have the
facilities nor the finances to renovate existing facilities so that they would
be adequate for mothers and children.23 It has been claimed that prison
would be an unhealthy environment for children both physically" and
emotionally.3 0 These are certainly concerns to be considered, but none of
22. A MONTAGUE, TOUCHING: THE HUMAN SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SKIN (1971).
23. Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977).
24. J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss: ATTACHMENT 324 (1969).
25. A recent study found that seventy-five percent of incarcerated mothers resume care of
their children upon release. A. STANTON, WHEN MoTHERS Go To JAM- (1980).
26. J. BoWLEY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss: SEPARATION 12-16 (1973).
27. Allowing the child to stay with its mother till the age of two ensures that the mother-
child bond has a good foundation. However, it should be noted that-
A child above the age of two or three... should not remain in prison with the par-
ent. By this time the parent-child bond is well established, and the child's physical
and emotional needs require freedom of movement and contact with other children
that may not be available in the prison setting.
On Prisoners and Parenting, supra note 5, at 142.
Children learn how to interact with the environment by exploration. The tendency to
explore usually begins around the age of 18 months and increases greatly over the
next few years. Children whose exploratory behavior is overly restricted during these
early years may grow up with strong inhibitions against trying anything new or chal-
lenging, including attempts to develop relationships with other people.
Id. at 1425 n. 81.
28. Sametz, supra note 5, at 301.
29. June Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2. The Florida Department of Corrections, in
lobbying to have the statute amended so that babies would no longer be permitted to re-
main with their mothers, cited the en masse living conditions of a prison as exposing the
infants to a higher risk of disease and argued that the babies' presence creates an additional
security risk in that they might be taken hostage in an escape attempt. Id.
30. One objection that might be raised to housing children with offenders is that chil-
dren are likely to imitate the behavior they see around them and thus become
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these fears have materialized in the studies that have been conducted on
the longest running program where incarcerated mothers were allowed to
keep their babies.8 1
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
In states where statutory grounds exist to support an incarcerated
mother's claim to the care and custody of her child, the constitutional
questions usually will not be reached. 2 However, in those states without
statutory grounds, an incarcerated mother's claim relies heavily on the
argument that the parent (mother-child) relationship has been recognized
as fundamental. The concept that babies should be allowed to stay with
their mothers in prison was bolstered by the following language of the
Supreme Court: "[I]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nur-
ture of the child reside first in the parents. . . ."3 Although there is no
specific mention of the family relationship in the Constitution, the Su-
preme Court in a long line of cases,34 has recognized that "[tihe entire
fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that underlie its specific guar-
antees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy, to marry and raise
a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights
specifically protected." 85 These are incorporated into the Constitution
criminals themselves. This does not, however, seem to be a realistic concern. Parents
are unlikely to be engaging in visible criminal behavior while they are residents of a
supervised community.
On Prisoners and Parenting, supra note 5, at 1423 n.74.
31. Junior League of the City of New York, Prison Nursery Study: A Summary Report of
Findings (August 1974), cited in On Prisoners and Parenting, supra note 5, at 1. New York
state has had an on-going program for the last forty years which allows a mother to keep her
newborn infant until the child reaches one year of age. The mothers and children are housed
on the prison grounds, but their living quarters are separate from the rest of the prison
population.
32. Brief for Appellee at 15, Wainwright v. Moore, 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979). In those states which have statutes allowing an inmate mother to keep her newborn
with her, the courts should not reach the constitutional issue when a statutory interpreta-
tion would suffice to satisfy the parties' claim. The state issues should be decided first, and,
if dispositive, the need to reach the federal questions would be precluded. See Siler v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
33. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (emphasis added) (state inteference
with parent's right to control religious training of child).
34. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (right to live with
family members); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (liberty under the fourteenth
amendment includes parent's "right to the care, custody,. . . and companionship of...
minor children."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (proper to enjoin
an Oregon statute which interfered "with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control"); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (existence of a constitutionally protected interest in preserving the family unit
and raising one's children).




under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Once an interest is recognized as being protected by the fourteenth
amendment, the government must afford "some kind of hearing" before
the deprivation of the interest, absent exigent circumstances."' Removing
an infant from the care of its incarcerated mother without a hearing is
analogous to the situation in Stanley v. Illinois,3 7 where an unwed fa-
ther's children were declared wards of the state upon their mother's
death. The Supreme Court in Stanley found that the state's legitimate
interest in "the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the mi-
nor" did not outweigh the unwed father's interest in his child.3 A parent
is entitled to a forum and the opportunity to show why his interest in his
children should not be terminated.39
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determina-
tive issues of competence and care... it needlessly risks running rough-
shod over the important interests of both parent and child. . .. It insists on
presuming rather than proving [the parent's] unfitness solely because it is
more convenient to presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause
that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a hearing ....40
The Supreme Court's holding in Stanley supports the contention that
separating a baby from its incarcerated mother without a hearing where a
case by case determination can be made, is violative of the mother's and
baby's right to due process under the fourteenth amendment.4 1
Those who oppose allowing incarcerated mothers to care for their ba-
bies seek to justify the intrusion into the custodial arrangements between
mother and child on the sole basis of the mother's incarceration.4 2 Incar-
ceration alone, however, is not an adequate reason for such an intrusion
upon the mother's rights; for although a prisoner's rights "may be dimin-
36. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
37. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
38. Id. at 652.
39. Id. at 658.
40. Id. at 656-58.
41. The fourteenth amendment reads in pertinent part: "Section 1 ... No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law. .. ." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. Since requirements of procedural due
process apply only to the deprivation of interests protected by the fourteenth amendment, it
is mandatory to look to the "nature of the interest at stake." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (emphasis in original). There is no definitive listing of protected inter-
ests but the interest in family integrity has been recognized as one whose nature is "essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness." Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 390.
42. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (constitutional rights become circum-
scribed as a result of incarceration). See also Tales of the Unborn, NAT'L L.J., June 15,
1981, at 35, col. 1. (Illinois Supreme Court denied a habeas corpus petition on behalf of a six
month fetus whose mother was in jail.)
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ished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a pris-
oner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is im-
prisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisoners of this country. '4 Assuming for the sake
of argument that the incarceration rationale is a sufficient basis for cur-
tailing the mother's right to family integrity, the infringement of the
child's right to family integrity would still have to be justified.
V. NATIONWIDE STATUS OF BABIES BEHIND BARS
Currently there are no specific figures on how many children are being
retained nationwide in correctional institutions in order to be with their
mothers. However:
[The] 1970 Census [listed] 53 children under the age of 5 in correctional
institutions and another 60 in local jails and workhouses. The census also
shows 67 children between the ages of 5 and 9 in prison and 76 in local jails.
These children are distinguished from those living in training schools for
juvenile delinquents and thus it is unlikely that they are in correctional in-
stitutions as a result of their own criminal activity.4
There are only seven states whose statutes have provisions allowing in-
fants to stay with their incarcerated mothers for any period of time.
These states are California, Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina and Virginia.4 5 A majority of the states' statutes do not
address the issue at all. At least three states have had statutes in the past
allowng the practice, but have since repealed them.4" The statutes of five
other states refer only to the procedure for dealing with pregnant woman
offenders who are under the death sentence. 47 In all cases the execution is
43. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
44. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF CENSUS, PERSONS IN INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER
GROUP QUARTERS Table 3, at 5 (1973). This was the most up-to-date information available at
the time of publication.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3410-3424 (West 1980) (community correctional setting for
mothers and their babies as a result of a court's refusal to allow a mother to keep her child
for the two-year period authorized by CAL. PENAL CODE § 3401 (West 1970) (repealed 1980));
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18.69A (West Supp. 1981) (baby may stay for 60 days while per-
manent placement arranged); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (baby
may stay under special circumstances if deemed in the best interest of the child); N.J. REv.
STATE § 44.105 (1937) (child's place of settlement with inmate mother); N.Y. CoRRc. LAw §
611 (McKinney 1968) (babies can remain with their mother for one year); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
148-47 (Repl. VoL 1978) (baby can stay only until permanent placement is made elsewhere);
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.285 (Repl. Vol. 1978) (baby may remain with mother if deemed in its
best interest).
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24(2) (West 1977) (repealed 1981); KAN. CRim. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 76.2506 (Vernon 1917) (repealed 1977); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § tit. 34, § 875 (1930) (re-
pealed 1977).
47. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.800 (Vernon Supp. 1982);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 176.465 (1979); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2949.31 (Baldwin 1982); OKLA.
684 [Vol. 16:677
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stayed until after the woman has given birth. Two states give their gover-
nors specific authority to commute the sentences of pregnant women." s
Of those states which have statutes permitting inmate mothers to keep
their newborn children, the program in New York has undergone the
most thorough evaluation. 49 On two occasions the interpretation of sec-
tion 611 of the New York Correctional Law"0 has been the subject of liti-
gation. In Apgar v. Beauter,5' the Supreme Court of Tioga County found
that it was in the child's best interests to stay with its mother. The court
enjoined the sheriff from continuing to keep them apart, and stated:
It is a general and well-established principle in this state that the welfare
of a child is best served by remaining with its natural parent .... That
incarceration in a jail or correctional institution per se does not constitute
such unfitness or exceptional circumstances so as to require that a newborn
infant be taken from its mother is attested to by the enactment by the legis-
lature of Section 611(2) of the Correction Law. In fact, it has been New
York's policy for over forty years to permit inmate mothers to keep their
newborn infants. So important does the Legislature consider the natural
mother-child relationship that even the father does not have the power
under this statute to countermand the decision of an inmate mother to keep
her child.
52
More recently, in Bailey v. Lombard,53 the Supreme Court of Monroe
County decided it would not be in the best interests of the child to re-
main with his mother. The decision, however, was based on the lack of
parenting skills the mother had exhibited in the past with her other chil-
dren rather than on the fact that she was incarcerated."
Recently, various groups have addressed the issue of allowing incarcer-
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1010-1011 (West 1981).
48. MAss. ANN. LAws ANN. ch. 127, § 142 (Michie Law Co-op 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-
281 to -283 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
49. Junior League of the City of New York, Prison Nursery Study- A Summary Report of
Findings (August 1974) cited in On Prisoners and Parenting, supra note 5, at 1.
50. N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 611 (McKinney 1968). The pertinent part of § 611 of New York
Correctional Law reads:
A child so born may be returned with its mother to the correctional institution in
which the mother is confined unless the chief medical officer of the correctional insti-
tution shall certify that the mother is physically unfit to care for the child, in which
case the statement of the said medical officer shall be final. A child may remain in the
correctional institution with its mother for such period as seems desirable for the
welfare of such child, but not after it is one year of age, provided, however, if the
mother is in a state reformatory and is to be paroled shortly after the child becomes
one year of age, such child may remain at the state reformatory until its mother is
paroled, but in no case after the child is eighteen months old.
Id.
51. 75 Misc. 2d 439, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1973).
52. Id. at , 347 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
53. 101 Misc. 2d 56, 420 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1979).
54. Id. at , 420 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
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ated women to keep their newborns with them. The American Correc-
tional Association, in articulating its suggested standards, stated:
It is generally believed that babies should be delivered in community hos-
pitals, and in most cases placed directly in the community. However, in
those states where deliveries do occur at the institution hospital, they
should be placed as soon as possible in the community, either with relatives
or in some foster home .... [H]owever, flexibility should allow for the
mother who has only a short period of her sentence left and who is in a
position to care for her baby when she returns to the community to care for
the baby in the institution until she leaves.55
While not sanctioning mothers keeping their babies with them in prison,
the American Correctional Association does recognize the need for
flexibility.
The American Bar Association, in their tentative draft of The Legal
Status of Prisoners, recommended that "[tihe domestic relationships of
persons convicted of criminal offenses should be governed by rules appli-
cable to free citizens. Conviction or confinement alone should not be suffi-
cient to deprive a person of... parental rights, including the right to
direct the rearing of their children. ' 56 In the Commentary to their stan-
dards, the American Bar Association elaborated by observing that:
Many states now provide nursery facilities for children born during confine-
ment. The newly born child remains with the mother generally during the
nursing period. American institutions should experiment with providing fa-
cilities for a more extended period to allow prisoners of either sex to keep
their children with them during confinement, either continuously or for
short periods regardless of the child's age.57
To date, the most positive endorsement of the concept of babies stay-
ing with their incarcerated mothers is by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.5 8 It drafted model legislation
which had as its goal the preservation of incarcerated individuals' paren-
tal rights. The proposed legislation provides the guidelines for establish-
ing a program where the incarcerated mother could retain her child.
VI. VIRGINIA'S TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE
In 1918, the Virginia General Assembly provided for the disposition of
infants of convict mothers by passing legislation that allowed the mother
to keep with her the infant that she had prior to her incarceration or
55. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL Ass'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 568 (1966).
56. ABA Joint Comm. on the Legal Status of Prisoners, The Legal Status of Prisoners 14
AM. CRIM. L. RE V. 377, 619-20 (1977) (tentative draft).
57. Id. at 620.
58. MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 4-116, Comment (approved by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law in 1978).
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infants born during her incarceration until they reached the age of four
years. When the infants reached the age of four, they were returned to
the jurisdicton from which their mother was sentenced to be disposed of
as the circuit court saw fit.5 9 In 1930 the Code of Virginia was amended to
read much as it does today. 0 Section 53-285 of the Virginia Code cur-
rently provides that when a woman confined in a penal institution gives
birth, "[a] child so born may be returned with its mother to the institu-
tion in which its mother is confined, if the Director of the Department of
Corrections, in his judgment, deems it will be for the best interest of the
child."61
Virginia has had statutory authority allowing incarcerated women to
keep their babies for a period of time since 1918. The vital question is
how, if ever, that authority was implemented. Unlike New York, Virginia
has never had a highly organized program, and the Virginia Department
of Corrections has maintained few, if any, records concerning the program
in Virginia. 62
There is no information available either in written or oral form con-
cerning Virginia's execution of the statute prior to 1943. From 1943 to the
early sixties, women were allowed to keep their babies until they were
released or until the babies reached the age of two. 3 Infants were born in
59. 1918 Va. Acts, ch. 276 (emphasis added) (amended 1930).
Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That an infant accompanying a
convict mother to the penitentiary or born after her imprisonment therein, shall be
committed to the State board of charities, or returned, on attaining the age of four
years, to the county or city from which the mother came, to be disposed of as the
circuit court of said county, or the hustings or corporation court of said city, having
jurisdiction, may order.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 1903a (1930) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 53.285 (Repl. Vol.
1978)).
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.285 (Repl. Vol. 1978) (emphasis added).
62. Women offenders in Virginia were housed in a separate section of the men's peniten-
tiary in Richmond until 1932 when a facility known as the State Industrial Farm for Women
(later changed to Virginia Correctional Center for Women) was built in Goochland, Virginia.
There is little written documentation available about the program which allowed infants
to stay with their incarcerated mothers. This lack of written information was verified by
checking the Director's Office, the Department of Corrections, their central files and reseach
and reporting sections, and by searching the minutes of the Board of Corrections and its
predecessor, the Board of Welfare and Institutions. The records of the Virginia Correctional
Center were also checked. Due to this lack of written material, most information for this
section was obtained from oral interviews with past and present staff members of the Vir-
ginia Correctional Center for Women. There is no satisfactory explanation concerning the
Department of Corrections lack of documentation of the policies of the in-house care of
infants by their inmate mothers. The data from such a program would be significant to all
involved parties. One can speculate that the reason for such faulty record-keeping is that,
since only one state institution housed women prisoners, a formal state-wide policy was not
considered necessary.
63. Interview with Clara Kent, retired correctional officer, in Goochand County (Sept. 23,
1981). Mrs. Kent was employed at the Virginia Correctional Center for Women from 1943 to
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the clinic and were kept in the nursery. The women stayed on the clinic
hall until the doctor released them to go back to their regular living unit.
The babies remained on the clinic hall and were cared for by an inmate
whose job assignment was to work on that hall. The mothers were allowed
to visit with their children for several hours on Sunday afternoon follow-
ing chapel services. The majority of the women kept their infants at the
institution. The greatest number of babies ever in the nursery at one time
was twenty-one, although the number averaged from ten to twelve. Most
babies left the institution between nine months and eighteen months of
age.6
The length of time the babies were allowed to stay decreased to three
months around 196465 and to thirty days in 1968.68 In the early 1970's
infants began staying in their mothers' rooms in the clinic. The mother
was responsible for caring for her own child until it left the institution at
the end of the thirty-day period.6 7 Beginning in 1972, the women were no
longer delivered at the institution but were taken to the Medical College
of Virginia."' However, they were still allowed to bring their babies back
to the institution for thirty days. 9 In 1976 the new superintendent, Ann
Houston Downes, discontinued the policy which permitted women in-
mates to bring their babies back to the institution for thirty days.7 0 Since
1980 and is the earliest source of information that could be located.
64. Telephone interview with Jane Doe, a retired nurse, in Goochland County (Sept. 23,
1981). Jane Doe, who wishes to remain anonymous, was employed in the clinic at the Vir-
ginia Correctional Center for Women from 1947 to 1968 and was Supervisor of the nursery.
65. Interview with Shirley Burton, Assistant Superintendent, Virginia Correctional
Center for Women, in Goochland County (Sept. 23, 1981). Shirley Burton has been em-
ployed at the Virginia Correctional Center since 1964. Burton remembers the time period
infants were allowed to stay with their mothers being changed to three months right after
she started work, but she does not remember who changed it or why it was changed.
66. Id. Shirley Burton stated that the time period was changed to 30 days in 1968. Leake
Parrish and Brenda Hill both verified that the time period was changed to 30 days in 1968.
Interview with Leake Parrish, retired Superintendent, Virginia Correctional Center for Wo-
men, in Goochland County (Oct. 4, 1981); Interview with Brenda Hill, Head Nurse, Virginia
Correctional Center for Women, in Goochland County (Sept. 23, 1981).
67. Interview with Brenda Hill, supra note 66. As Head Nurse, Brenda Hill was responsi-
ble for changing the procedure so the inmate mothers could keep their babies in their
rooms.
68. Inter-Office Correspondence from Byron Marshall, Hospital Administrator, to Direc-
tor of the State Bureau of Child Health (Mar. 13, 1972) (notification that maternity delivery
at the State Industrial Farm for Women had been closed).
69. Interview with Leake Parrish, supra note 66; Interview with Brenda Hill, supra note
66.
70. Interview with Ann Houston Downes, Superintendent, Virginia Correctional Center
for Women, in Goochland County (Sept. 31, 1981). Superintendent Downes, who has held
her present position since 1976, stated:
I discontinued the policy of allowing the infants to stay with their mothers for thirty
days as I felt it was not in the best interests of either the infant or mother, that it
would be easier on both if the separation was made before they became attached to
688 [Vol. 16:677
INCARCERATED MOTHERS
that time women inmates have had to make plans for their family or
friends to pick up infants from the hospital. If a woman is unable to make
arrangements for her child, it is placed with the Department of Welfare
in the locality from which the woman was sentenced.71
It is interesting to note that no case has ever been litigated in Virginia
under the statute which requires a determination by the Director of the
Department of Corrections of what is in the best interest of the child. If
an incarcerated pregnant woman in Virginia should bring suit to keep her
baby, as Moore did in Florida, arguably the court should determine that,
at the very least, she has a right to a hearing before her request is denied.
There would be two bases for such a finding.
First, the validity of the present policy can be challenged on the
grounds that the guidelines set out in the statute have not been adhered
to. The prospective mother is being deprived of the opportunity to have
the question of custody and control of her child decided, not by the indi-
vidual vested by statute with the authority to make such a decision but
by a blanket institutional policy. The Director of Corrections is not given
the opportunity to determine the best interests of a particular child since
that question is never brought to his attention.
Second, the statutory language very clearly states that the judgment of
the Director of the Department of Corrections should be based on the
best interests of the child. 2 It would be difficult, if not impossible, to
determine the best interests of a particular child without making a case
by case determination based on the facts of the individual situation.
The decision making power vested in the Director is analogous to a
judicial custody hearing. In custody hearings, Virginia courts are guided
by section 31-15 of the Virginia Code, which states that in any case in
which the parents are living apart, the court "in awarding the custody of
the child to either parent or to some other person, shall give primary con-
sideration to the welfare of the child.173 The court in Burnside v. Burn-
side74 reiterated the premise that "in determining custody, we are con-
cerned first and foremost with what is best for the child. Always the
each other. Other factors that I considered were the inadequate facilities available,
and the feelings of other women inmates whose incarceration had forced them to
leave their children behind.
Id. (quote approved by Superintendent Downes). The Superintendent also felt that a prison
was not the proper environment for a child in its formative years. The policy of not allowing
the babies to return to the institution with their mothers has never been reduced to writing.
71. Id. Superintendent Downes explained that the pregnant woman's institutional coun-
selor helps her find living arrangements for her child. The counselor tries to place the child
with relatives; if that cannot be arranged, the Welfare Department is contacted.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.285 (RepL Vol. 1978).
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
74. 216 Va. 691, 222 S.E.2d 529 (1976).
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primary and controlling consideration is the child's welfare. All other
matters are secondary." 5 By implication, considerations of the availabil-
ity of facilities within prisons, the extra planning required, and the effect
of the arrangement on the rest of the prison population should be secon-
dary to the needs of the child.
The following criteria have been established by the courts in child cus-
tody cases for the purpose of determining the best interests of a child.
These same criteria should be considered in determining the custody of a
child whose mother is incarcerated. First, it is to the child's benefit to
remain with its natural parent.70 In the majority of cases when a child is
not allowed to stay with its incarcerated mother its alternative living ar-
rangement is not to live with its other natural parent, but rather with
relatives of the mother or in a foster home.77 Second, the child's needs are
best served by continuity of care from a specific individual.78 Records in-
dicate that most incarcerated women resume the care of their children
when released.7 9 The caregiver also must be physically and emotionally
capable of raising her child.80 The Department of Corrections has medical
doctors and psychologists who would be available to provide the director
with information regarding each incarcerated mother's ability to ade-
quately care for her child.
The moral character of the caregiver is another factor which is consid-
ered by the courts.81 In evaluating this element the director should keep
in mind that incarceration alone is not evidence of unfitness per se as
evidenced by section 53-285 of the Virginia Code. Additionally, a child's
material needs must be taken into account although they are not control-
ling.82 The legislature must have been mindful in enacting section 53-285
of the Virginia Code that there would be some expense involved.83 Fi-
75. Id. at 691-92, 222 S.E.2d 529-30.
76. McCreery v. McCreery, 218 Va. 352, 237 S.E.2d 167 (1977).
77. Mothers Behind Bars: A Look at the Parental Rights of Incarcerated Women, 4 NEw
ENGLAND J. PRISON L. 141, 143 (1977) (for a variety of reasons most incarcerated women are
single parents).
78. Harper v. Harper, 217 Va. 477, 229 S.E.2d 875 (1976).
79. A. STANTON, supra note 25.
80. 218 Va. at 355, 237 S.E.2d at 168-69.
81. Campbell v. Campbell, 203 Va. 61, 122 S.E.2d 658 (1961).
82. 218 Va. at 356, 237 S.E.2d at 171.
83. The child's material needs could be met with nominal expenditure by the Department
of Corrections. In computing the expense, however, it is necessary to remember that the
program would only involve between 10 and 20 babies per year. Interview with Betty
Browning, Records Custodian, Virginia Correctional Center for Women, in Goochland
County (Sept. 23, 1981). The following statistics are available for the number of infants born
at the institution for the years 1971 through 1974: 20 infants from 1971 to 1972, 4 infants
from 1972 to 1973, and 10 infants from 1973 to 1974. Head Nurse Brenda Hill recalled that
seven babies were born to women incarcerated at the Virginia Correctional Center for Wo-
men in 1980, two were stillborn. Interview with Brenda Hill, supra note 66. Two were still-
born. Statistics were not available for other years.
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nally, the courts have considered the child's age in making custody deci-
sions. The "tender years doctrine," first enunciated in Virginia in Mullen
v. Mullen,8 4 illustrates the principle that as long as the mother is fit,85
there is a rebuttable inference that a child's place is with the mother,
particularly in those cases where the child is of tender years. Although
the tender years inference only becomes operative as a matter of law in
custody disputes between natural parents, the Supreme Court of Virginia
has noted that:
[lit has nothing to do with the respective rights of the two parents. Rather,
it has to do with the right of the child. The "presumption" is, in fact, an
inference society has drawn that such right is best served when a child of
tender years is awarded the custodial care of its mother.88
Just as the child's best interest must be considered in custody disputes
between natural parents, it is clear that the reasoning of the tender years
doctrine is equally applicable where the mother is incarcerated.
A second reason to find a hearing necessary is the constitutional argu-
ment that the right to family integrity is fundamental.8 7 A fundamental
right cannot be denied absent a due process hearing.8
Virginia is at a crossroads. Its statute is not an accurate reflection of
actual practice; in fact, the statute and reality are diametrically opposed.
There are clearly two options open if the state wishes to correct the cur-
rent situation. The General Assembly can either repeal section 53-285 of
the Virginia Code, or the Department of Corrections can formulate a pol-
icy to bring its actions into compliance with the statute as written. If the
legislature determines that incarcerated women should not be allowed to
keep their infants in prison, whether this determination is based on lack
of facilities, lack of financial resources or the physically and emotionally
unhealthy impact of a prison on children, then the current statute should
be revised or repealed.
If, however, the Department of Corrections decides on the second alter-
native, the policy should provide for an individualized hearing by the Di-
rector. In this manner, the Director would be able to make a case by case
determination based on the facts of each case. The prospective mother
should also be provided the opportunity to present information favorable
to her request to care for her child. Finally, the policy should delineate
84. 188 Va. 259, 49 S.E.2d 349 (1948).
85. Some opponents point to the mother's incarceration as evidence of her unfitness per
se. This viewpoint is not compatible with section 53-285 of the Virginia Code. If the legisla-
tors had believed a mother could or should be declared unfit based solely on the fact that
she was incarcerated, they would never have enacted section 53-285 of the Virginia Code.
86. McCreery v. McCreery, 218 Va. 352, 354, 237 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1977).
87. Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 19 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
88. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
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factors which the Director could evaluate in making his judgment, such
as: the mother's physical and emotional ability to care for the child, the
woman's institutional record, the plans made for the child after the
mother's release, and the alternate plan for the child if the mother's re-
quest is denied.
VII. CONCLUSION
The question of whether a woman who gives birth while incarcerated
should be allowed to keep her child with her is in a state of flux. In the
final analysis, the solution must balance the needs of the prison officials,
the state, and the incarcerated woman with paramount attention given to
the needs of the individual child. While opponents point to the dangers of
prison life, it is essential to recognize that their catastrophic predictions
have not materialized in those states which have experimented with the
idea. For instance, no child has been held hostage. Children face compa-
rable dangers in the free world. All of these dangers are speculative and
one does the best one can to protect children from them. The potential
physical risk does not outweigh the recognized emotional benefits the
child receives from being with its mother. The best way to ensure in the
balancing process, that the child's best interests are the pivotal factor, is
to decide on a case by case basis, as called for in Wainwright v. Moore,8"
whether an individual child should be cared for by its inmate mother.
Donna L. Brodie
89. 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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